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It is quite remarkable how Marlow’s recurrent characterisation of Kurtz as a spectre 
in Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ has passed almost unnoticed in the large body of 
criticism on the novella. This essay interprets Marlow’s persistent expression of 
loyalty to Kurtz’s ghost as the last in a series of ideological strategies that endow the 
imperialist culture in which he is embedded with a minimum degree of consistency 
that counterbalances the debilitating exposure of its evils. The ensuing pages develop 
this central thesis concerning Kurtz’s ghostly status by drawing on Slavoj Žižek’s 
Lacanian approach to the ideological function of the spectre, which allows the author 
to diverge from other readings of ‘Heart of Darkness’ relevant to this topic. An 
exploration of the logic of spectrality helps to explain why the novella falls short in its 
indictment of imperialist ideology, a failure which, in the last instance, amounts to an 
endorsement. 
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EXORCISMO FALLIDO: EL ESTATUS ESPECTRAL DE KURTZ Y SU 
FUNCIÓN IDEOLÓGICA EN ‘HEART OF DARKNESS’ DE CONRAD 
Sorprende el hecho de que la recurrente caracterización de Kurtz como espectro en ‘Heart of 
Darkness’ de Conrad haya pasado prácticamente desapercibida en la ingente cantidad de trabajos 
críticos sobre esta novela corta. En este ensayo se interpreta la persistente expresión de lealtad de 
Marlow hacia el fantasma de Kurtz como la última de una serie de estrategias ideológicas que dotan 
a la cultura imperialista en la que está inscrito de un mínimo de consistencia que contrapesa el 
desenmascaramiento debilitador de sus males. En las páginas que siguen se desarrolla esta tesis 
central sobre el estatus fantasmal de Kurtz tomando como base la interpretación lacaniana que Slavoj 
Žižek hace sobre la función ideológica del espectro, lo que permite al autor distanciarse de otras 
lecturas de la obra de Conrad relevantes para el tema tratado. Un análisis de la lógica de la 
espectralidad ayuda a explicar por qué la novela no acaba de condenar del todo la ideología 
imperialista, una inhibición que equivale, en última instancia, a una adhesión. 
Palabras clave: ‘Heart of Darkness’; Kurtz; espectro; ideología; Žižek; voz 
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1. Introduction 
Critics of Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ have shown little concern towards Marlow’s 
persistent characterisation of Kurtz as a spectre.1 He describes Kurtz as a “disinterred body”, 
a “ghost”, a “shade”, an “initiated wraith from the back of Nowhere”, “an animated image 
of death”, a “shadow”, an “atrocious phantom”, an “apparition”, “a vapour exhaled by the 
earth” and an “eloquent phantom” (Conrad 1946: 115, 117, 134, 142, 160). Even those 
critics who frame the novella within the genre of the gothic either overlook this 
conspicuously gothic element or just go no further than dropping some passing remark on the 
topic.2 John Hillis Miller’s ‘Joseph Conrad: Should We Read Heart of Darkness?’, chapter five 
of his book Others (2001), is a most remarkable exception. Miller’s argument concerning the 
novella revolves around the unexplained obligation that Marlow feels towards Kurtz, a sort 
of fateful imperative he cannot but obey.3 Indeed, immediately after what I consider the 
privileged blind spot in his narrative, Marlow justifies his decision to go after Kurtz, who had 
left the steamboat to return to his nightly worshippers in the wilderness, in the following 
terms: “I did not betray Mr Kurtz —it was ordered I should never betray him— it was written I 
should be loyal to the nightmare of my choice. I was anxious to deal with this shadow by myself 
alone” (Conrad 1946: 141. Emphases added). In being loyal to Kurtz, Marlow is, according 
to Miller, fulfilling the ethical injunction of telling “the truth about the dead” whom one 
survives (2001: 107). Yet, Miller adds, what is peculiar about Marlow’s bond is that it is an act 
of faith towards one who is already a ghost from the very beginning:  
Kurtz is presented when Marlow finally encounters him as already the survivor of his own 
death. Kurtz is already the ghost of himself. In that sense he cannot die. This is testified to in 
the way he survives in Marlow’s narration and in the way the dusk still whispers his last words 
when Marlow returns to Europe and visits Kurtz’s ‘Intended’. It is hardly the case that Marlow 
has laid the ghost of Kurtz’s gifts with a lie, since the ghost still walks, even in the room where 
Marlow tells his lie to the Intended. The ghost, far from being laid, is resurrected, invoked, 
conjured up, each time Heart of Darkness is read (2001: 107). 
According to this, ‘Heart of Darkness’ is a text that activates a chain of compulsory (and, we 
may add, compulsive) interpretations focused on Kurtz’s ghost which starts with Marlow’s 
narrative, passes then on to the unnamed frame-narrator, and afterwards transcends the 
intratextual limits to affect any reader of the Conrad novella. We, readers, like Marlow and 
the receptive listener of his inconclusive oral tale, must remain faithful to Kurtz’s ghost and 
                                                 
1 This paper was completed under the auspices of the research project Modernism and 
Postmodernism in the English Short Story (funded by the Consellería de Innovación e Industria, Xunta de 
Galicia, Cod. INCITE 08PXIB204011PR). I want to thank Dr. Laura Lojo Rodríguez for her caring 
support. I also acknowledge my debt to the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript. 
2 See, for instance, Lipka (2008) and Glover (2001). Mark Wollaeger (1990) frames Conrad’s 
oeuvre within the tradition of philosophical scepticism and relates its gothic and melodramatic 
elements to a covert search for the sacred. Although he explores the presence of the trope of the 
ghost in Conrad’s earlier short pieces, Wollaeger’s only statement concerning Marlow’s relation to 
“the diabolical specter of Kurtz” is that it elicits a “[r]esentment at feeling dependent [which] may 
cover a deeper fear”, a fear of vacancy due to the absence of God (1990: 75). 
3 Bernard J. Paris points out that Marlow’s acknowledged loyalty to Kurtz is the key enigma of 
the novella and expressed his surprise at how little critical attention this aspect had received (2005: 
42-43). Paris explains this bond in terms of Marlow’s identification with Kurtz and his wish to 
preserve his good name. 
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join the endless circuit of performative interpretations which are so many failed attempts to 
exorcise this spectre. Kurtz functions as the privileged instance of radical otherness that, 
paradoxically at once, cannot and should not be finalised, demanding justice from us, and 
keeping “[t]he structure of Heart of Darkness … a self-perpetuating system of an endlessly 
deferred promise” (Miller 2001: 126).  
I share Miller’s opinion that Kurtz’s spectre is not exorcised despite Marlow’s 
affirmation that he had “laid the ghost of his gifts with a lie” (Conrad 1946: 115).4 Unlike 
Miller, however, I interpret Marlow’s failed exorcism and his concomitant loyalty to 
Kurtz’s ghost not as an ethical obligation to avoid totalising temptations and keep the field 
of otherness open, but as Marlow’s last-ditch attempt to preserve the coherence of the 
British and imperialist culture in which he is embedded and from which he derives his 
identity. Thus, for me, Kurtz-as-ghost functions in Marlow’s narrative discourse as the last 
and lasting one in a long series of ideological strategies. Although it, the ghost, does evoke 
an opening that activates the production of potentially countless interpretations, it also 
serves to cover the void of what Jacques Lacan called the real, which Marlow encounters at 
what I take to be “the culminating point of my [Marlow’s] experience” (Conrad 1946: 51). 
In the end, to remain loyal to Kurtz’s spectre is Marlow’s way of avoiding the traumatic 
real of his own desire and the horror of cutting off his symbolic moorings in an act of 
freedom. Because he is both incapable and unwilling to exorcise Kurtz’s spectre, Marlow 
cannot but reproduce imperialist ideology. 
2. Two versions of the spectre: Žižek with Lacan and against Derrida 
Miller’s conception of the ghost and its implications for the living owes a great deal to 
Jacques Derrida, whose work he cites frequently. Derrida (1994) conceived of the spectre as 
that which disjoins the stability of the present by its apparition, as the point of “non-
contemporaneity with itself of the living present” (1994: xix.; Italics in original). In the political field, 
all dominant forms of power try to exorcise the spectre in order to restore the menaced 
presence. Thus, the emancipatory potential of the spectre lies in the fact that it stands as an 
opening towards, a possibility for, and a promise of freedom and justice if and only if we 
respond, listen and speak to it (Derrida 1994: xix, 11, 12, 33, 38, 58, 65).5 Hence Derrida’s 
ethico-political message in this work is that the spectre must not be made present through 
exorcism, conjuration or ontologisation, as the latter would entail the dissolution of the 
spectre’s spectrality, the effacement of “the heterogeneity of the other” (Derrida 1994: 29), 
and the deactivation of its liberating potential. Faith, duty, responsibility to the spectre is the 
right, just, liberating attitude one must retain; what he calls hauntology as opposed to ontology.6 
“Totalitarian perversions” like savage capitalism, Fascism, and Stalinism are for Derrida “the 
effect of an ontological treatment of the spectrality of the ghost” (1994: 93). In sum, the 
ontologisation of the spectre is a way to cope with the fear caused by the spectre’s call to 
freedom (Derrida 1994: 104-05). 
                                                 
4 Peter E. Firchow in his book-length study of ‘Heart of Darkness’ affirms that Marlow does not 
lay Kurtz’s ghost in the end and that readers of the novella are also haunted by this phantom (2000: 80). 
5 Derrida’s notion of the spectre-as-other is based on Emmanuel Lévinas’s Totalité et infini (1961), a 
work in which justice, or the possibility thereof, is literally equated to our relation to the other’s 
otherness: “‘The relation to others–that is to say, justice’” (Lévinas qtd. in Derrida 1994: 23). 
6 “Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration” (Derrida 
1994: 161). 
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Slavoj Žižek opposes Derrida’s view of the spectre qua herald of freedom/justice-to-
come and the latter’s defence of spectral Otherness as our ultimate ethico-political horizon. 
From a Lacanian perspective, Žižek argues that the uncanny, fear-inspiring, terrifying, 
horrifying spectral apparition is already, in itself, a withdrawal, a retreat, an escape from 
freedom. Thus, Žižek writes in ‘The Spectre of Ideology’ (1994a): 
‘freedom’ designates the moment when the ‘principle of sufficient reason’ is suspended, the 
moment of the act that breaks the ‘great chain of being’, of the symbolic reality in which we are 
embedded; consequently, it is not sufficient to say that we fear the spectre—the spectre itself 
already emerges out of a fear, out of our escape from something even more horrifying: 
freedom. … Therein resides the gap that separates Lacan from Derrida: our primary duty is not 
towards the spectre, whatever form it assumes. The act of freedom qua real not only 
transgresses the limits of what we experience as ‘reality’, it cancels our primordial indebtedness 
to the spectral Other (1994a: 27-28). 
Freedom —that is, the breakaway from our subjection to the symbolic order that 
structures the real into ‘reality’—should be the truly emancipatory outcome of our 
encounter with the real. However, because this encounter suspends “the symbolic reality 
in which we are embedded”, we withdraw in horror, and the spectral apparition is 
primarily an effect of this horror and not its cause. Žižek agrees with Derrida in that the 
“elusive pseudo-materiality” of the spectre “subverts the classic ontological oppositions of 
reality and illusion, and so on” (Žižek 1994a: 20-21). Yet, whereas for Derrida (and for 
Miller) the ghost prevents the closure of the ethico-political order by preserving the place 
for otherness so that our obligation towards the ghost empowers us to resist full 
subjection, in Žižek’s Lacanian view it is precisely the spectre and our loyalty to it that 
eventually allows for the closure of the ideological field. The spectre fills the gap in the 
symbolic order and endows the symbolically constructed ‘reality’ in which we, subjects, are 
embedded with the needed minimum degree of coherence: 
it is here [in the spectre] that we should look for the last resort of ideology, for the pre-
ideological kernel, the formal matrix, on which are grafted the various ideological formations: 
in the fact that there is no reality without the spectre, that the circle of reality can be closed only 
by means of an uncanny spectral supplement. … ([W]hat we experience as) reality is not the 
‘thing itself’, it is always-already symbolized, constituted, structured by symbolic mechanisms—
and the problem resides in the fact that symbolization ultimately always fails, that it never 
succeeds in fully ‘covering’ the real, that it always involves some unsettled, unredeemed 
symbolic debt. This real (the part of reality that remains non-symbolized) returns in the guise of spectral 
apparitions. … [S]pectral apparitions emerge in this very gap that forever separates reality from 
the real, and on account of which reality has the character of a (symbolic) fiction: the spectre 
gives body to that which escapes (the symbolically structured) reality. The pre-ideological 
‘kernel’ of ideology thus consists of the spectral apparition that fills up the hole of the real. (Žižek 
1994a: 21; Italics in the original). 
The spectre therefore signals a breach in the ideological edifice, yet works at once as the 
pseudo-material stuff to keep it (even if precariously) erected. This duality determines the 
logic of Marlow’s relationship to Kurtz’s spectre which is at the base of the ambiguous and 
contradictory position he holds towards imperialist ideology that critics, particularly from 
Terry Eagleton onwards, have not failed to point out.7 Tending to the ghost, remaining loyal 
                                                 
7 “The message of Heart of Darkness”, Eagleton writes, “is that Western civilisation is at base as 
barbarous as African society –a viewpoint which disturbs imperialist assumptions to the precise 
degree that it reinforces them” (1976: 135). The interpretation of the novella as both an attack on 
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to it, is, in the last instance, an ideological gesture that Marlow adopts to avoid carrying out 
the “act of freedom qua real” (Žižek 1994a: 27), even if, and precisely because, such a gesture 
is unsettling and nightmarish. 
3. Subject, object and the nature of symbolised reality 
The linkage between the free act and the real was formulated by Lacan in his seminar The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. An “act, a true act”, Lacan stated, “always has an 
element of structure, by the fact of concerning a real that is not self-evidently caught up in it” 
(1981: 50). The act qua real has effects on symbolically structured reality and on the subject’s 
immersion in it. It is thus that Žižek, following Lacan, argues that “an act proper is the only 
one which structures the symbolic co-ordinates of the agent’s situation: it is an intervention 
in the course of which the agent’s identity itself is radically changed” (2001: 85; see also Žižek 
2000: 125). The symbolic order, via interpellation, elicits in the subject the identification with 
certain social models, the assumption of certain subject-positions and the internalisation of 
certain regulations. However, it is not only the subject that is split, barred, traversed by a void 
($), but also the field of the big Other, the symbolic order (Ø) (Žižek 1989: 122). The 
function of ideology is, precisely, that of providing substitute fantasy-objects to compensate 
for the desiring subject’s constitutive loss of the primordial object, to reinforce his/her 
subjection through the supplement of enjoyment attached to these objects, and to veil the 
gaps, inconsistencies and antagonisms of the socio-symbolic field.8 
As I have discussed elsewhere, we come across two fantasy-objects articulated in 
Marlow’s narrative discourse the function of which is to avoid the real of antagonism 
through, on the one hand, the presumption of some transcendental essence that defines the 
identity of normative subjects beyond symbolic prescriptions and that endows the symbolic 
field with solidity and coherence, namely, Marlow’s invocation of some indeterminate ‘true 
stuff’, which I called introjected object [Conrad 1946: 97]), and, on the other, the projection of 
conflicts and inconsistencies inside the symbolic field (natives and jungle as the projected object 
onto which antagonism is displaced and condensed) (Sacido Romero 2009).9 To these two 
ideological rationalisations10 we must add several other strategies that allow Marlow to fence 
                                                                                                                      
and a reproduction of imperialist ideology was already advanced by Conrad himself in his letter of 
February 8, 1899, to Robert Cunninghame Graham (Conrad 1983: 157-58). For further opinions see 
Benita Parry (1983: 2), Patrick Brantlinger (1988: 265), Vincent Pecora (1989: 145), Gary Aldeman 
(1987: 50), Edward W. Said (1993: 23-25, 30), Beth Sharon Ash misdirection (1999: 80) and Terry 
Collits (2005: 108). 
8 In The Plague of Fantasies Žižek writes that “the ‘sublime object of ideology’ is the spectral object 
which has no positive ontological consistency, but merely fills in the gap of a certain constitutive 
impossibility” (1997: 76). He gives the following definition of ideology: “a symbolic field which 
contains such a filler holding the place of some structural impossibility” (1997: 76). See also Žižek 
(1997: 1, 75-77, 2005: 276-77).  
9 For a definition of introjection and projection and their reformulations in the work of different 
authors see Laplanche and Pontalis (1985: 229-31, 349-56). Though mainly not in psychoanalytical 
terms, the dynamics of projection has been the main target of postcolonial approaches to the novella 
that underline its imperialist bias. See, for instance, Chinua Achebe (1988: 251-52), Francis B. Singh 
(1988: 272), Fayad (1990: 300), Zhuwarara (1994: 26), A. James M. Johnson (1997: 112). 
10 I use the word in the sense the psychoanalysis gives to the term rationalisation: “a procedure 
whereby the subject attempts to present an explanation that is either logically consistent or ethically 
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off the twinges of bad conscience for having joined what he feels is a “conspiracy” (Conrad 
1946: 56) and to preserve a basic quota of stable identity through an otherwise exceedingly 
disruptive experience in the context of high imperialism. He justifies his participation in the 
colonial concern by referring to his unemployment (Conrad 1946: 52-53), to his seduction by 
overpowering forces such as the fascinating river on the map and the fateful knitters of black 
wool (Conrad 1946: 56-57), and to his enlightened and cynical (un)belief in the goodness of 
the Company and of the civilising mission which, as Johanna M. Smith has argued, is 
counterbalanced in the novella by the two white women, Marlow’s aunt and Kurtz’s 
Intended, whose naïve credulity “will keep the masculine world [of crude reality] from 
deteriorating” (1989: 193). In carrying out the function of believing, both women fill in the 
dots in Marlow’s statement about the superiority of British imperialism: “What redeems it is 
the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and unselfish 
belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to. 
. . .” (Conrad 1946: 51. Ellipsis in the original). To Smith’s argument it should be added, 
however, that if such a vicarious dynamics is possible, it is because, as Žižek states, “the most 
intimate beliefs, even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, 
laughter, can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity” (1989: 34).11 
Marlow laughs at women’s naïve belief in the philanthropic mission trumpeted forth daily in 
the newspapers (to which Kurtz contributed), yet his words betray him: white colonial agents 
in general and Marlow in particular, using Marlow’s own words, “set the women to work” to 
do the job of believing in the redeeming virtues of imperialism, so that they may go about 
exploiting the natives and robbing the land of its wealth, “not a pretty thing when you look 
into it too much” (Conrad 1946: 53, 50-51).12 Despite his presumed unbelief, Marlow goes 
on doing his job as best he can. In other words, the belief from which he distances himself in 
theory is inscribed into the very practice of his appointed duty. 
In what follows I will develop the idea of the ideological status of Kurtz’s spectre by first 
locating the exact point of Marlow’s encounter with the real and reviewing Lacanian 
approaches to the novella; second, examining the particular aural nature of spectrality (voice 
as objet a) and its link to the obscene superego underside of the Law, and finally concluding 
that Marlow’s failure to exorcise Kurtz’s spectre is the last resort to reproduce imperialist 
ideology in the novella despite his own exposure of its evils. 
4. Marlow’s encounter with the real and his flight to Kurtz as spectre: forced choice 
vs. ethical act 
Marlow’s tale of his experience in “the centre of a continent” (Conrad 1946: 60) contains a 
particular moment of incomparably intense and absolutely contingent horror which in 
Lacanian theory is precisely known as “the encounter with the real” (Lacan 1981: 53; Italics in 
original). Lacan pronounced this phrase in session 5 of his seminar titled ‘Tuché and 
Automaton’, in the midst of a discussion on Freud’s fundamental concept of repetition-
                                                                                                                      
acceptable for attitudes, ideas, feelings, etc., whose motives are not perceived” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 1985: 375). 
11 Žižek refers to the example given by Lacan in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: the Greek Chorus. 
The Chorus feels pity and horror for us, so that we, at once, experience these feelings and are freed 
from the duty of having to do it.  
12 Johanna M. Smith is right in underscoring the ideological function of the aunt and the 
Intended in the novella, yet falls short in explaining how and why it works. 
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compulsion. In brief, tuché is the Aristotelian term used by Lacan to designate the encounter 
with the real which is the cause of the repetition-compulsion in the symbolic order 
(automaton). “The real”, Lacan states, “is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, 
the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle” 
(1981: 53-54). The symbolic order, ruled by the pleasure principle, strives for stability, for 
homeostasis, but is always frustrated in this pursuit by something it cannot assimilate, a scrap 
left over in the symbolising process that structures reality, “the kernel of the real” (1981: 53) 
that lies beyond the pacifying, meaning-giving register of the symbolic. One of the exemplary 
manifestations of the real is trauma. Trauma is what set Freud on the track towards the 
formulation of the repetition-compulsion and the death-drive in view of the fact that some 
of his patients fell prey to a sort of automatism that made them re-experience painful 
incidents, a fact that challenged his previous view that the pleasure-principle was the 
sovereign ruler of our mental life and that dreams were just wish fulfilments (Freud 2001: 
32). Lacan states: “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter in so 
far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first presented 
itself in the history of psychoanalysis in a form that was … that of the trauma” (1981: 55). 
This traumatic event resists being apprehended by symbolic categories (it is ‘missed’) because 
it is related to the subject’s own unconscious desire which for Lacan finds in the dream its 
privileged scenario: “It is only in the dream that this truly unique encounter can occur” 
(1981: 59). 
With Kurtz finally on board the steamboat, Marlow wakes up “shortly after midnight” 
and walks on deck to fall asleep again “leaning over the rail” because of the “strange narcotic 
effect upon [his] half-awake senses” of the “steady droning sound of many men chanting 
each to himself some weird incantation” (Conrad 1946: 140-41). He wakes up a second time 
because of “an abrupt burst of yells, an overwhelming outbreak of a pent-up and mysterious 
frenzy” which “was cut short all at once, and the low droning went on with an effect of 
audible and soothing silence” (Conrad 1946: 141). Marlow relates how, after finding out that 
Kurtz was not in his cabin, he went through a moment of incomparably intense, 
indescribable horror. The extraordinary nature of this experience is enhanced in the text by 
sorting out the passage through full stops: 
I think I would have raised an outcry if I had believed my eyes. But I didn’t believe them at 
first—the thing seemed so impossible. The fact is I was completely unnerved by sheer blank 
fright, pure abstract terror, unconnected with any distinct shape of physical danger. What made 
this emotion so overpowering was—how shall I define it?—the moral shock I received, as if 
something altogether monstrous, intolerable to thought and odious to the soul, had been thrust 
upon me unexpectedly. This lasted of course the merest fraction of a second, and then the 
usual sense of commonplace, deadly danger, the possibility of a sudden onslaught and 
massacre, or something of the kind, which I saw impending, was positively welcome and 
composing. It pacified me, in fact, so much, that I did not raise an alarm (Conrad 1946: 141). 
Relieved by the recovery of his sense of reality, of a reality of deadly dangers and 
potential massacres, Marlow jumps ashore to rescue Kurtz from the call of his night adorers. 
This act of loyalty to Kurtz is inflected in paradoxical terms: as both an incontestable 
injunction (“it was ordered”, “it was written”) and an act of the will (“the nightmare of my 
choice”) (Conrad 1946: 141. Emphasis added). What becomes apparent at this point is that 
Marlow’s faithful attachment to Kurtz’s ‘shadow’ is a fantasy erected in the outmost confines 
of symbolically constructed reality to prevent its complete collapse due to the traumatic 
eruption of the real, of that which—because, as Lacan states, “it is essentially the missed 
encounter”— Marlow cannot provide any identifiable, communicable, trait, and just says that 
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it was “impossible”, exempt from normal temporalisation (“lasted the merest fraction of a 
second”), overwhelmingly terrifying (“sheer blank fright, pure abstract terror”) and 
absolutely contingent (“thrust upon me unexpectedly”). As such, Kurtz’s loyalty-inspiring 
spectre in Marlow’s experience (“a dream”, he calls it) and in his narrative (“relation of a 
dream”) serves as a veil to hide the encountered real (“the incredible”), which is 
“impossible”, which cannot be symbolised, rendered in words,13 yet triggers the production 
of signifiers (his narrative) in a foredoomed attempt to grasp it (Conrad 1946: 82). 
Some recent approaches to ‘Heart of Darkness’ where use is made of the Lacanian 
notion of the real—particularly relevant and insightful are the contributions of French 
Conradians—have failed to take into account Kurtz’s spectral status and its ideological 
function in Marlow’s narrative discourse. The most explicit is Josiane Paccaud-Huguet’s 
passing remark on Kurtz’s being “the ‘phantasmagorical’ figure on the screen of fiction, for 
that impossible subject position: to rejoin, and rejoice in the inhuman, forbidden area of the 
Freudian Thing” (2004: 172). In her reading of the early Marlow narratives and ‘Karain’, 
Paccaud-Huguet states that Kurtz and Jim (in Lord Jim) affect Marlow because they had 
performed an act of transgression towards the real, considering Kurtz as “clearly a good 
candidate for embodying jouissance of the thing in itself at its purest” (2006: 76). Because he 
accepts this transgression, Paccaud-Huguet argues, Kurtz becomes heroic in Marlow’s eyes 
and so deserves his loyalty.14 Reynold Humphries is the only critic who refers to the passage 
about “a sheer blank fright” quoted in full above as one which marks “the presence of the 
real” (1998: 11). For him, Kurtz’s “The horror! The horror” is also “the encounter with the 
real” and considers the jungle the place of the maternal body and the site of incestuous 
desires (Humphries 1998: 12). Establishing a comparison between Conrad’s ‘Heart of 
Darkness’ and some horror films, Humphries describes Kurtz as a “living-dead” which elicits 
Marlow’s guilt due to repressed incestuous desires, yet interprets Kurtz’s status as “mort-
vivant” as a condensation of the relationship between cannibalism and death (1998: 15). 
Moreover, he connects Marlow’s recurrent use of spectral terminology specifically to “the 
whites adrift … in the African continent” (Humphries 1998: 18). Tony C. Brown has 
recourse to Žižek’s notion of psychosis to conceptualise the darkness located in Africa as 
what “‘fills out and blocks the perspective’ of civilization and its constitutive codes” (Žižek 
1991: 52. Qtd. in Brown 2000: 16). The colonial frontier which the Congo best represented 
in the discourse of the times was the site of a formless void which threatened the consistency 
of European culture and had to be foreclosed. Brown quotes from Conrad’s personal 
account of his Congo experience in ‘Geography and Some Explorers’ (1924) and in Edward 
Garnnet’s ‘Introduction to Letters from Joseph Conrad, 1895-1924’ (1928) to support his view 
that the adventurous youthful illusions which worked as a frame organising his experience of 
reality (in the Lacanian sense of the term) were destroyed by something which blocked the 
perspective. Conrad’s traumatic encounter is interpreted by Brown in terms of Lacan’s 
“encounter with the real” (2000: 20). Yet, Brown’s reading of ‘Heart of Darkness’ relies too 
much on youthful illusions as the “fantasy-frames” constitutive of reality in their 
confrontation with the real (2000: 20). True, Conrad and Marlow had to foreclose the threat 
of dissolution to restore culture’s consistency and reinstitute the authority of cultural codes, 
                                                 
13 Lacan calls it “unassimilable” and also “the impossible” (1981: 55, 167. Emphasis in original). 
14 Christine Texier (2002) substantiates the distinction between the real and reality in the Conrad 
novella by opposing fragmentariness, suggestiveness, negation, formlessness as characteristic 
features of the real to binding, framing, shaping, veiling elements, images and language which are 
constitutive of reality as a counterweight to the real.  
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but whereas the remains of his childish tendency to follow the steps of explorers and 
discover some uncharted lands may have been the stuff that Conrad’s fantasy-scenario was 
made of, in Marlow’s case this seems not to be so. 15 As he tells his audience, the blank space 
he “had a hankering after … was not a blank space anymore. … It had ceased to be a blank 
space of delightful mystery—a white patch for a boy to dream gloriously over” (Conrad 
1946: 52). Apart from codes, from ‘reality’ structured by the symbolic order, it is true that the 
supplement of fantasy is needed. Yet, Marlow’s sustaining fantasy is not of the type of 
juvenile illusion he celebrated before the same audience of friends in ‘Youth: A Narrative’ 
(1898): fantasy in Marlow’s account in ‘Heart of Darkness’ is of another nature, and it 
manifests itself in the different ideological strategies of which Kurtz’s spectre is the last and 
seemingly everlasting one: “I have remained loyal to Kurtz to the last, and even beyond” 
(Conrad 1946: 151). Taking into account his direct reference to Lacan’s thesis about ‘the 
encounter with the real’ in Four Fundamental Concepts, it is rather surprising that Brown does 
not select the passage where this encounter is more directly rendered but chooses instead to 
place the spotlight on what happens right afterwards in the jungle as the “heightened, 
climatic point in the novel [where] there is revealed the absolute and terrifying failure of 
signification and its attendant authority in the midst of the dark wilderness” (2000: 23). At 
this point Marlow had already fled from this most frightening and traumatic experience into 
the reality preserved by the nightmare of his choice, forever haunted by Kurtz’s spectre, 
which works, as Lacan says, as “the screen that conceals something quite primary, something 
determinant in the function of repetition” (1981: 60). In the act of recounting that 
exceptional past experience,16 Marlow is visited again by the ghost whose exorcism he had 
not performed so as to prevent his disengagement (“separation” in Lacanian terms [1981: 
213]) from the symbolic order and retain his position as a normative subject throughout 
(“He was the only man of us who still ‘followed the sea’” [Conrad 1946: 48. Emphasis 
added]). Thus, in the account of his visit to the Intended, Marlow states: “For her he had 
died only yesterday. And, by Jove! the impression was so powerful that for me, too, he 
seemed to have died only yesterday—nay, this very minute.… I saw him clearly enough then. I 
shall see this eloquent phantom as long as I live” (Conrad 1946: 157, 160. Emphases added).17 The 
ethereal and growingly aural efflorescence (Kurtz’s spectre) emerging from Marlow’s 
encounter with the real returns in the reactualisation of his experience in the narrative: “it 
was written I should be loyal to the nightmare of my choice. I was anxious to deal with this 
shadow by myself alone,—and to this day I don’t know why I was so jealous of sharing with 
any one the peculiar blackness of that experience” (Conrad 1946: 141-42).  
                                                 
15 Actually, evidence from letters of the period in which Conrad got his command of a 
steamboat belonging to the Société Anonyme Belge pour le Commerce du Haut-Congo shows that his frame 
of mind at that time was far from the childish or youthful fantasising that Tony Brown says 
organised Conrad’s Congo experience and that was thrown into complete disarray after his traumatic 
encounter with the real. (See Conrad’s letter from Tenerife to Marguerite Poradowska of 15 May 
1890 in Conrad [1983: 51]).  
16 Exceptional both professionally (“I suppose you fellows remember I did once turn fresh-water 
sailor for a bit” [Conrad 1946: 51.) and psychologically (“relation of a dream…of being captured by 
the incredible which is of the very essence of dreams” [Conrad 1946: 8]; Italics added in both). 
17 Marlow’s use of the adverb yesterday (“he had died only yesterday”), instead of the day before or 
the previous day, is ungrammatical and indicates how the spectre undermines chronological order in 
his account, causing a temporal confusion of past and present that collapse into one another and are 
projected into a future in which the haunting persists (“this very minute”, “as long as I live”). 
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Beyond the chain of signifiers (Marlow’s tale) there persists the spectral screen of the 
unsymbolisable, impossible real, tantalisingly precluding symbolic closure in a fully 
comprehensible narrative: “no relation of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, … it is 
impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one’s existence—that which 
makes its truth, its meaning—its subtle and penetrating essence. It is impossible. We live, as 
we dream—alone. . . .” (Conrad 1946: 82. 2nd ellipsis in the original). However, Kurtz’s 
spectre functions at the same time as a fantasmatic supplement to screen the void of the real, so 
that, I maintain, what hinges Marlow and his narrative to the symbolic—in spite of his ironic 
detachment from regulating ideas and beliefs of the markedly imperialist ideology in which 
he is embedded—is his attachment to the ghost of Mr Kurtz. It is the thin, yet 
overpowering, layer of Kurtz’s spectre that serves to obfuscate the real of his desire, that 
keeps Marlow from carrying out a free act that deserves the qualification of ethical according 
to Lacan’s view in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, where he states: “the only thing of which one 
can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire” (1992: 319). The betrayal of 
one’s desire (of not having ‘acted in conformity with the desire that is in you’, impervious to 
the prescriptions instilled in us by ideology) binds us more strongly to the Law, and that 
concomitantly provokes in us unappeasable guilty feelings which are dispensed by an agency 
Lacan calls “superego” (1992: 314). For Lacan, the superego is not that which regulates our 
adaptation to social prescriptions through inflicting guilt on us for violating them, but, rather, 
the perverse agency that orders us to derive enjoyment from our submission to the Law and 
the guilt-ridden renunciation of our desire.18 This superego agency is however related to the 
figure of the obscene father of the primal horde in Freud’s Totem and Taboo, the “violent, 
jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away the growing sons” 
(1998: 121). In the Freudian myth, the sons killed the father and erected social restrictions as 
barriers to the full access to jouissance that the primordial father had enjoyed and which is now 
strictly forbidden for the community of sons (a renunciation dubbed castration in 
psychoanalytical theory). The murder of the father-jouissier is succeeded by a figure or mode 
of paternal authority deprived of enjoyment: namely, the Name-of-the-Father, the set 
prohibitions and regulations that make up the symbolic order that structures reality and 
constitutes subjects by binding them to the Law. Our constitution as subjects of the 
symbolic order entails what Lacan made clear was a forced choice: “Your money or your life! If I 
choose the money [jouissance], I lose both [I die as a subject with a place within the symbolic 
order even before I am born]. If I choose life [an identity invested by the symbolic order], I 
have life without money, namely, a life deprived of something [pre-symbolic jouissance]” 
(1981: 212). As Žižek puts it: “the emergence of the subject from the encounter of a 
presymbolic life substance of ‘enjoyment’ and the symbolic order, … the inclusion of the 
subject in the symbolic community, has the structure of a forced choice: the subject supposed to 
choose freely his community … does not exist prior to this choice, he is constituted by 
means of it” (1992: 74-75).19 But this constitutive inclusion brought about by a forced choice 
has an obscene underside in the agency of the superego, the leftover of the primordial, un-
castrated father whose demand of enjoyment mortifies us and reinforces our subjection 
through his voice: “Although, unlike this dead father, we have submitted to ‘castration’, his 
                                                 
18 In Encore, we come across Lacan’s most explicit reformulation of the Freudian superego: 
“Nothing forces anyone to enjoy (jouir) except the superego. The superego is the imperative of 
jouissance—Enjoy!” (1998: 3). See also Žižek (1994b: 68). 
19 The choice is between symbolic identity and psychosis, between bad and worse (Žižek 1992: 75-76).  
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voice persists as an object-remainder in the symbolic fabric, exhorting us to derive enjoyment from 
the law” (Kay 2003: 171. Emphasis added). 
Marlow’s loyalty to Kurtz’s spectre is actually the unethical submission to this obscene 
superego, not the ethical injunction to keep the field of otherness open for Justice avenir. 
Žižek, himself, states apropos ‘Heart of Darkness’ that Conrad is to be credited for being the 
first in portraying this obscene perverse father in literature: “[the] figure of the ‘other 
father’—the obscene, uncanny, shadowy double of the Name of the Father—emerged for 
the first time in all its force in the novels of Joseph Conrad” (1992: 158).20 In Žižek’s view, 
Marlow’s predicament is marked by his incapability of getting rid of the primordial father.21 
This subjection is, indeed, literally rendered in terms of a ‘forced choice’ (a ‘choice’ that was 
‘ordered’), a mark of the subject’s inclusion in the symbolic order. In choosing the nightmare 
that Kurtz represents (his lack of restraint, his brutality and his greed) over the nightmare 
embodied by the Manager and his gang (corruption, inefficiency, manipulation), he is not 
choosing a better, fairer, more virtuous version of European or British imperialism, he is 
pretending to do so, knowing very well that the colonial enterprise is illegitimate, criminal 
and unjust. What Marlow is truly forced to choose is Kurtz qua obverse side of the Name of 
the Father, whose representative figure in the text is the apathetic director of the Company 
he interviewed to sign his ‘contract’:  
A door opened, a white-haired secretarial head … appeared, and a skinny forefinger beckoned 
me into the sanctuary. Its light was dim, and a heavy writing-desk squatted in the middle. From 
behind that structure came out an impression of pale plumpness in a frock-coat. The great man 
himself. He was five feet six, I should judge, and had his grip on the handle-end of ever so 
many millions. He shook hands, I fancy, murmured vaguely, was satisfied with my French. Bon 
voyage (Conrad 1946: 56; Italics in the original). 
That Kurtz is the obscene double of the Name of the Father (that is, of symbolic authority 
emptied of jouissance) is rendered in the narrative by an echo, a reappearance in Marlow’s 
mind of one of the feminine figures flanking the door of the Company’s sancta sanctorum. 
Going after Kurtz to prevent his joining his night adorers, Marlow tells his audience, “I had 
some imbecile thoughts. The knitting old woman with the cat obtruded herself upon my 
memory as a most improper person to be sitting at the other end of such an affair” (Conrad 
1946: 142). The same figure opens the door onto both the Name-of-the-Father and its 
obscene underside.22 
                                                 
20 Some of the features Žižek attributes to Kurtz fit his most famous filmic counterpart (Captain 
Willard in Apocalypse Now) better than the original character in the Conrad novella. 
21 Private conversation with Slavoj Žižek on July 9, 2010. 
22 This irruption is already anticipated in Marlow’s prospective comment on his exit from the 
great man’s office: “Often far away there I thought of these two, guarding the door of Darkness, 
knitting black wool as for a warm pall, one introducing, introducing continuously to the unknown, 
the other scrutinizing the cheery and foolish faces with unconcerned old eyes” (Conrad 1946: 57). 
Marlow’s description of the street and the office building is Kafkaesque avant la lettre (Conrad 1946: 
55). ‘Heart of Darkness’ also anticipates Kafka’s universe by establishing a link between the Law and 
jouissance, yet, whereas in Kafka the Law (the bureaucratic legal machinery) and jouissance are united in 
the same figures or inhabit the same spaces (“obscene judges who, during night interrogations, 
glance through pornographic books”, or the couple copulating in the very courtroom where poor 
Joseph K. is being interrogated by the judges in The Trial [Žižek 1992b: 146]), in Conrad’s ‘Heart of 
Darkness’ they are embodied by two different figures who, though connected in Marlow’s mind, 
inhabit two different spaces: on the one hand, the director and the Company’s headquarters, and, on 
the other, Kurtz and the jungle.  
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Tony Jackson (1994) states that Marlow left the Central Station in the hope that Kurtz 
would be the one man capable enough to bring “the Law of the Father to the uncivilized”, to 
a land that that he increasingly portrays as a pre-symbolic realm that threatens to engulf and 
drown the white man in a sea of unbearable jouissance (1994: 106).23 As he tells his audience at 
the end of Part I, he was so disgusted by the corruption and inefficiency of the men in 
charge of the two stations (exception made of the chief accountant) that he was eager, 
“curious to see whether this man [Kurtz], who had come out equipped with moral ideas of 
some sort, would climb up to the top and how he would set about his work when there” 
(Conrad 1946: 88). In sum, Marlow hoped Kurtz would stand as the Name of the Father, as 
the figure of symbolic authority that structures the real into reality by the imposition of the 
letter of the Law emptied of enjoyment —hence his insistence that “I made the strange 
discovery that I had never imagined him as doing, you know, but as discoursing”, and his fear 
that he would never had the opportunity to hear the “gifted creature” “speak” (Conrad 1946: 
113. Emphasis added). 
Kurtz’s talents and his performance did to a certain extent elevate him to that position of 
the Name of the Father, so that Marlow’s loyalty to him could be interpreted as his 
determination to preserve Kurtz’s status as a “remarkable man” (Conrad 1946: 138): as a 
competent coloniser with a stock of knowledge to improve commercial interests in the 
region (versus the Manager’s lack of efficiency as just “a common trader” with “peddling 
notions” [Conrad 1946: 73, 137]) yet whose plans were thwarted by the corruption and 
unfair play installed in the Company; as an apt contributor to the propaganda machinery (he 
gives a journalist friend of Kurtz’s the latter’s Report on the Suppression of Savage Customs 
for publication with the post-script conveniently torn off); as a relative caring enough to send 
“some family letters” Marlow gives his cousin (Conrad 1946: 154); and as a fiancé for whose 
love story Marlow provides a sublime melodramatic ending by telling the Intended that 
Kurtz’s last word was “’your name’” (Conrad 1946: 161).24 Indeed, Marlow insists that he felt 
compelled to keep Kurtz’s reputation: “I was to have care of his memory. I’ve done enough 
for it to give me the indisputable right to lay it, if I choose, for the everlasting rest in the 
dust-bin of progress. … But then, you see, I can’t choose. He won’t be forgotten. Whatever 
he was, he was not common” (Conrad 1946: 118-19).25 
In this way, it could be argued that ‘Heart of Darkness’ repeats the same pattern found in 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, where the young Danish prince is called on by the ghost of his 
murdered father to settle his accounts after his premature death. Kurtz’s spectre, like the 
ghost of old King Hamlet, inhabits what Žižek calls, after Lacan, a “place ‘between two 
deaths’”, between his physical, biological death and his symbolic death, the payment of his 
debt to the Other (1989: 135). However, Marlow’s careful defence of Kurtz’s reputation 
does not end in the pacifying exorcism of the spectre. Furthermore, he even entertains an 
attitude of ironic distance towards what he feels is Kurtz’s illegitimate claim, a detachment 
that is of kind with his reaction to his aunt’s foolish belief in the goodness of the civilising 
                                                 
23 Notice how sometimes the natives are portrayed as secretions or excrescences of the jungle 
qua Thing: “streams of human beings—of naked human beings— … were poured into the clearing 
by the dark-faced and pensive forest”; or “the forest that had ejected these beings so suddenly had 
drawn them in again as the breath is drawn in a long aspiration” (Conrad 1946: 133, 134). 
24 For a discussion of the melodramatic outcome in the typically masculine way of negotiating 
the split between the non-phallic (ethical goals and public aspirations and activities) and the phallic 
(sexual enjoyment) see Žižek (1994b: 152). 
25 Or, later on, Marlow promises the hectic Russian harlequin: “’Mr. Kurtz’s reputation is safe 
with me’. I did not know how truly I spoke” (Conrad 1946: 139). 
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mission and to the Intended’s faith in Kurtz’s devotion to both social ideals and to his love 
for her. Thus, Marlow’s mimicking echo of the Intended’s expressions of sincere feeling 
towards Kurtz (“‘I [the Intended] knew him best’. ‘You knew him best’, I [Marlow] 
repeated”; “‘His words, at least, have not died’. ‘His words will remain’, I said. ‘And his 
example’, she whispered to herself.… ‘True’, I said; ‘his example, too. Yes, his example, I 
forgot that’”; “‘The last word he pronounced was--your name’ … ‘I knew it—I was sure!’ . . . 
She knew. She was sure” [Conrad 1946: 158, 160, 161-62]) are in tune with Marlow’s account 
of Kurtz’s demand of justice with which Conrad chose to frame the final episode of his visit 
to the Intended: first Marlow says, “he [Kurtz] said one day, ‘This lot of ivory now is really 
mine. The Company did not pay for it. … I want no more than justice’… He wanted no 
more than justice—no more than justice” (Conrad 1946: 156. 2nd ellipsis in the original) and 
right at the end of his narrative, after telling the lie to the Intended, he states interrogatively: 
“Would [the heavens] have fallen, I wonder, if I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was 
his due? Hadn’t he wanted only justice?” (Conrad 1946: 162). And what is more, Marlow 
even goes as far as disavowing his own forced choice of nightmares by criticising in the 
Russian harlequin an attachment to Kurtz that equally applies to him: “I almost envied him 
of this modest and clear flame … I did not envy him his devotion to Kurtz, though. It came 
to him, and he accepted it with a sort of eager fatalism” (Conrad 1946: 126-27. Emphasis 
added). 
Ironic detachment and contradictory disavowal undermine the interpretation of Marlow’s 
loyalty to Kurtz’s ghost as an attempt to preserve his legacy. Furthermore, Miller’s Derridean 
view that Kurtz’s persisting spectrality is an instance of hauntology that keeps open the field of 
otherness which triggers off the proliferation of different interpretations and retains the 
promise of justice-to-come falls wide off the mark taking into consideration, among other 
things, Marlow’s derisive statements precisely on Kurtz’s claim for justice. The ghost in 
Marlow’s narrative discourse has, in view of what has been said, the ideological function of 
filling in the gap that traverses the symbolic order, an abyssal void that Marlow experienced 
as an encounter with the real where an unconscious desire was announced.26 So, it is not so 
much, as Reynold Humphries says, that Kurtz as a living-dead elicits Marlow’s guilt because 
of his repressed incestuous desires, but, rather, it is his loyal attachment to the spectre of 
                                                 
26 Stephen Ross (2004) offers a reading of what he calls a “virtually unexplored” area in the 
novella: namely, the interconnection between the ideological and the psychological (2004: 65). Desire 
is the element that links both dimensions: materialist desire for accumulation is the driving force of 
both individual colonial agents and of the Company as a corporate whole. Kurtz’s final cry is an 
articulation of “his vision of the truth of desire, its absolute insatiability and basis in an irremediable 
subjective lack (what Lacan calls déhiscence) upon which the commercial culture of modernity 
capitalizes” (Ross 2004: 86). Though I find Ross’s interpretation correct, his version of desire is 
completely different from the ethical conception which sustains my reading, which I draw from 
other moments in Lacan’s oeuvre and which I relate to Marlow, not to Kurtz. Furthermore, Kurtz 
may have broken, as Ross explains, the Company’s law and rediscovered “the instincts of unfettered 
desire in all their violence and uncompromising demand for unmitigated, uninterrupted, and 
undiluted jouissance” (2004: 82), yet his apparently regressive gesture does not bring about his 
abrogation of the Other as he still strives for the recognition of the symbolic order: for instance, he 
kept on writing for the newspapers and wanted kings to meet him at railways stations. Kurtz does 
not carry out an ethical act of breaking with the Law, but, rather, tries to circumvent the Company’s 
control because the latter is de facto inefficient, corrupt and unfair to his commercial talents. And this 
is also the reason why I cannot but disagree with Žižek’s view that Kurtz stands for “evilness qua 
ethical attitude” (1992: 158).  
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Kurtz that makes Marlow feel guilty for having compromised his unconscious desire and 
stopped short in carrying out the truly ethical act of separation from the symbolic order he 
finds wanting, lacking. Kurtz, as Žižek points out, stands for the obscene father of the primal 
horde, the obverse shadowy figure of the Name of the Father that Marlow is incapable and 
unwilling to exorcise. Marlow carries out his appointed function within the symbolic order 
and, at the same time, remains attached to the obscene underside of the Law through his 
adherence to “Mr. Kurtz”, to “the shade of Mr. Kurtz” (Conrad 1946: 117).  
5. Kurtz’s spectre goes aural: seeing, hearing and sticking to the Law 
As advanced above, the type of spectre Marlow deals with so as to remain inscribed within 
the symbolic order is an increasingly aural one. It is Kurtz as an overpowering ghostly voice 
that prevails over his more visual aspect, a voice that becomes more and more a sound 
disengaged from its human source, a purely terrifying, yet appealing, echo that carries no 
meaning.27 Marlow had hoped that Kurtz’s discourse would be that of the Law of the Father 
capable of investing order on the surrounding devastation and inefficiency, yet he ends up 
being bound to the undying echo of the primal father’s expiring whisper. “The man 
presented himself as a voice. Not of course that I did not connect him with some sort of 
action. … That was not the point. The point was in his being a gifted creature, and that of all 
his gifts the one that stood out preëminently … was his ability to talk, his words” (Conrad 
1946: 113). Marlow chooses a voice among disembodied voices, a voice which condenses 
“the ghost of his [Kurtz’s] gifts” and still ‘lingers’ while he is telling the story: “And I 
heard—him—it—this voice—other voices—all of them were so little more than voices—and the 
memory of that time lingers around me, impalpable, like a dying vibration of one immense jabber, 
silly, atrocious, sordid, savage, or simply mean, without any kind of sense” (Conrad 1946: 114-15; 
Emphases added). 
Kurtz’s aural spectre is spoken of in objective terms: his voice becomes a haunting 
object, an ‘it’. Mladen Dolar (1996) criticises the abandonment of voice, of sound, in 
Saussurean linguistics (that reduces it to phonemes within a structure) and in Derridean 
deconstruction (that attacks its consideration as self-transparent presence). For Dolar, voice 
is, rather, “the object in the Lacanian sense … [,] a leftover heterogeneous in relation to the 
structural logic that includes it” and “an interior obstacle to self-presence” (1996: 9-10, 16). 
Žižek (1996) speaks of the voice in similar terms: “voice is that which, in the signifier, resists 
meaning, it stands for the opaque inertia that cannot be recuperated by meaning” (1996: 
103). And he adds, “voice is neither dead nor alive: its primordial phenomenological status is 
rather that of the living dead, of a spectral apparition that somehow survives its own death, 
that is the eclipse of meaning” (Žižek 1996: 103). The sound that epitomises Kurtz qua 
“eloquent phantom”–a ghost Marlow declares he “shall see … as long as I live”– is his final 
cry: “’The horror! The horror!’” (Conrad 1946: 160, 149). It is this whisper, inaudible for the 
Intended, that reverberates in Marlow’s mind at the culminating point of his interview with 
this woman: “‘Don’t you hear them [Kurtz’s last words]?’ The dusk repeating them in a 
                                                 
27 Ivan Kreilkamp (1997) relates the disembodied voice to the invention of the phonograph at 
the turn of the nineteenth century: “If the ‘horror’ ascribed to Kurtz has something to do with his 
status as an individual who becomes nothing more or less than his voice, then his representation 
suggests the experience—new to Conrad and his readers in the late 1890s—of hearing someone’s 
voice reproduced by a phonograph” (Kreilkamp 1997: 231). 
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persistent whisper all around us … ‘The horror! The horror!’” (Conrad 1946: 161). Marlow’s 
mystifying mixture of seeing and hearing can be clarified by taking into account Žižek’s view 
that voice “points toward a gap in the field of the visible, toward the dimension of what 
eludes our gaze. In other words, their relationship is mediated by an impossibility: ultimately, 
we hear things because we cannot see everything” (1996: 93. Emphasis in the original).28 In Marlow’s 
account of Kurtz’s final cry we find a similar logic at work: a meaningless voice standing for 
what cannot be seen, a voice to which meaning and moral value is attached retrospectively 
by the voluntaristic listener: 
He had summed up—he had judged. ‘The horror!’ He was a remarkable man. After all, this 
was the expression of some sort of belief; it had candour, it had conviction, it had a vibrating note 
of revolt in its whisper, it had the appalling face of a glimpsed truth—the strange commingling 
of desire and hate. … True, he had made that last stride, he had stepped over the edge, while I 
had been permitted to draw back my hesitating foot. And perhaps in this is the whole 
difference; perhaps all the wisdom, and all truth, and all sincerity, are just compressed into that 
inappreciable moment of time in which we step over the threshold of the invisible. Perhaps! I 
like to think my summing-up would not have been a word of careless contempt. Better his 
cry—much better. It was an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by innumerable defeats, by 
abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions. But it was a victory! That is why I have 
remained loyal to Kurtz to the last, and even beyond, when a long time after I heard once more, 
not his own voice, but the echo of his magnificent eloquence thrown to me from a soul as translucently pure as a 
cliff of crystal (Conrad 1946: 151-52. Emphases added). 
It is the spectral echo, the object voice, through which Marlow hears either what cannot be 
seen (invisible), or what can be seen through (cliff of crystal). It is through the resonating whisper 
that Marlow ‘sees’ Kurtz’s phantom as long as he lives. 
If Marlow chooses Kurtz’s nightmarish voice over the other voices and remains loyal 
to it to the end and beyond, it is because Kurtz’s voice is that of the obscene authoritarian 
father of the primordial horde. Kurtz’s credentials as such a figure are repeatedly displayed 
in often-quoted passages such as: “Mr. Kurtz lacked restraint in the gratification of his 
various lusts” (Conrad 1946: 131); “I had to deal with a being to whom I could not appeal 
in the name of anything high or low” (Conrad 1946: 144; see also Conrad 1946: 116, 117-
18). The voice that haunts Marlow is, as any other voice qua spectral object, linked to the 
superego in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Mladen Dolar summarises what I have pointed out 
above in reference to the obscenely mortifying nature of the superego and relates it 
precisely to the voice object. The superego, he says, is “not just an internalization of the 
Law, but something endowed with a surplus that puts the subject into a position of 
ineradicable guilt: the more one obeys, the more one is guilty. … [T]he surplus of the 
superego over the Law is precisely the surplus of the voice; the superego has a voice, the 
Law is stuck with the letter” (Dolar 1996: 14). 
This voice that is beyond meaning, sense or logos, is, therefore, attached to the Law, it 
works (to use Žižek’s own words from a long quotation above) as “an uncanny spectral 
supplement” by means of which “the circle of reality can be closed” (1994: 21).29 For Dolar, 
                                                 
28 For an enlightening reading of the scopic drive in ‘Heart of Darkness’ that draws substantially 
on Lacan’s conception of the gaze see Devlin (2006). Devlin aptly shows how the wilderness-as-gaze, 
which Marlow tries uselessly to block and undermine, is a symptom of his and the European 
colonisers’ precarious sense of mastery over the colonised lands and peoples. 
29 Herein resides the difference between the ideological reading I propose and Vincent Pecora’s 
dense and suggestive phenomenological and existentialist interpretation of the Conrad novella in 
‘Heart of Darkness and the Phenomenology of Voice’. Drawing on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
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the object voice par excellence is that of the father of the horde, whose dying cry permeates the 
field of Law, echoing in the open crack constitutive of the symbolic order, yet serving in the 
last instance to cover it and to invest upon it a precarious sense of closure. The voice of the 
primordial father is the necessary and, at once, unavoidable counterpart of the Name of the 
Father. In reference to Lacan’s discussion of the shofar (a primitive horn used in religious 
rituals) in his seminar on anxiety, Dolar argues that “one has to recognise, in the sound of 
the shofar, the voice of the Father, the cry of the dying primal Father of the primitive horde, the leftover, 
which comes both to haunt the foundation of his Law and to seal it” (1996: 26. Emphasis added). It is 
this object voice, Dolar goes on, that “bears witness to the rest of that presupposed and 
terrible Father’s jouissance, which couldn’t be absorbed by the Law, that reverse side of the 
Father that Lacan calls le-père-la-joussance, his ultimate deadly cry that accompanies the 
instituted Law” (1996: 27; Italics in the original).30 It is precisely through his loyal attachment 
to Kurtz’s spectral superegoic voice that Marlow avoids confronting the lack in the symbolic 
order he came to experience and refrains from carrying out a final ethical act of freedom. In 
spite of being witness to the evils of the mission civilisatrise, Marlow is incapable of truly 
transcending imperialist ideology, of—in Edward W. Said’s terms in reference to the Conrad 
novella— “tak[ing] the next step” and “imagin[ing] a fully realized alternative to imperialism” 
(1993: 30, 25). In the last instance, this incapability follows the logic of a failure to exorcise 
Kurtz’s spectre, of “‘doing the impossible’, traversing the fantasy toward the Real”, of 
carrying out a true act (Žižek 2000: 127). 
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